For over 30 years, the grand strategy of one of the most important commands in the US military, CENTCOM, has consistently held fast to a commitment to neoliberal capitalism and an ostensibly free-market global economy. Any accrued national or global economic benefits are impossible to chart, of course, and so CENTCOM's securitization discourse relies upon vaguer, yet promissory logics about 'keeping the global economy open'. My aim in this paper is to show how the story of CENTCOM's mission is crucial to understanding how US military interventionism works today through a discursive geoeconomic imagination that is vague yet persuasive in its universalist dimensions. In a period marked by globalisation and new forms of capitalist accumulation, CENTCOM's mission has nevertheless habitually involved fashioning itself in a neoliberal 'world policeman' role, and to that end has employed a strategy that can be best described as one of 'geoeconomic deterrence'. The paper outlines the entwined military and economic security logics of this strategy, which have resulted in the Middle East and Central Asia being repeatedly conditioned as requiring forms of corrective military interventionism. Since its establishment in 1983, CENTCOM's strategy papers, mission statements and annual reports to Congress have collectively scripted practices of intervention and deterrence that rely upon dominant registers of military and economic risk. In critically considering CENTCOM's mission, the paper shows how the command's initiation fundamentally changed US foreign policy by solidifying the Carter Doctrine and subsequently committing to the geoeconomic shaping of the most energy-rich region on earth.
Introduction
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was established on 1 January 1983; it was a watershed moment for contemporary US geopolitics. It signalled a new era of global ambition in the aftermath of the failure of US grand strategy in Southeast Asia, and it solidified the Carter Doctrine and a renewed focus of US foreign policy on the world's most energy-rich area. For the past 30 years, CENTCOM has been a vital appendage of the US national security state in enacting US foreign policy in the Middle East. From its inception, it was tasked with the military-economic securitization of what it calls the 'Central Region'.
Looking to the 21st century in the late 1990s, the command published a key strategy paper, Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century; outlined within is a military mission for the new century to 'protect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability' (US Central Command 1999a). The precarious and pivotal nature of the so-called Central Region, its energy resources and aleatory future have long been persuasive registers in CENTCOM's national security discourse. This paper explores CENTCOM's military production of the Middle East and Central Asia by examining the command's key geopolitical and geoeconomic scriptings over the last 30 years. These are commonly reductive and imperial, yet form part of a broader abstracted envisioning of US national security that has been instrumental in the 'making' of the region as intrinsically a space of insecurity necessitating intervention, regulation and ultimately saving from itself (Sidaway 1998; Gregory 2004) . I consider, in particular, interventionary tactics familiar to any reader of colonial history, namely the identification of threat, disorder and volatility, with the simultaneous signalling of liberal correction and universalist special mission. In the case of CENTCOM, the successful championing of a necessary US ground presence in its 'Area of Responsibility', tasked with a mission of geoeconomic deterrence, has been achieved via a consistent conflation of military and economic 'vital' security interests. The resultant operation of military-economic securitization involves a number of concerns to political and cultural geography, including especially the enduring role of geopolitical US Central Command and Liberal Imperial Reach 3 abstraction in imperial interventions, and the logics and mechanisms of interventionary security that enable commercial opportunities.
The paper begins by discussing some of the challenges and developments in writing critically about geopolitics, geoeconomics and the modalities of security that have come to define late modern war. It then presents a short historical geography of the US in the Middle East and Central Asia in recent years, to offer a backdrop to CENTCOM's successful military grand strategy that has resulted in the US going from no bases in the region in the early 1980s to an unprecedented level of territorial access and fully operational bases today.
I then focus on CENTCOM's forward deployment, and major military interventions over the last 30 years, including the Tanker War in the 1980s, the Gulf War and its aftermath in the 1990s, and the command's spearheading of the so-called war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. Threading through my analysis is a focus on the strategy of 'deterrence', which captures precisely how CENTCOM has sought to 'shape' military and economic security and its attendant commercial opportunities. This is exemplified, in particular, by examining CENTCOM's extension into Central Asia in 1999, as part of a broader US global liberalization project in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Finally, attention is drawn to CENTCOM's current posturing of bases, logistic sites, prepositioned equipment and forwarddeployed troops as part of a grand strategy to preemptively secure the aleatory future of the world's most energy-rich region. A concern for the place of 'political economy' in the emergence of critical geopolitics has been a feature of debate from the beginning. Gerard Toal, for example, in an early exchange with Simon Dalby, asserted that the consequences of an 'evisceration of political economy for the detailed analysis of the practice of foreign policy' are considerable (Ó Tuathail 1996b, 652) . Toal later conceded that more is needed on 'the embeddedness of geopolitical formations and discourses in structures of political economy' (Ó Tuathail 2000, 393) , and a similar concern was frequently voiced by the late Neil Smith, who argued that the political economy of imperialism, along with the 'social relations giving rise to [it]', were not sufficiently examined (2000, 370) . In more recent years, Smith, with Deb Cowen, has argued for 'geoeconomic spatiality' as being vital to 'the ongoing transformation of political geography ' (2009, 25) . Citing the impossibilities of contemporary border security, Cowen and Smith challenge 'geopolitical conceptions' of international relations, which they argue may 'better be captured today by a "geo-economic" conception of space ' (2009, 24) . Their argument echoes a number of theorizations of security that have drawn upon Micheal US Central Command and Liberal Imperial Reach 5 Foucault's translated lectures on biopolitics and security at the Collège de France in the late 1970s -Miguel de Larringa and Marc Doucet, for example, reasoning that one of the 'key dynamics' in 'the relationship between security and circulation' is that 'security's object remains beyond its grasp, that the deployment of the technologies of security is done within a context marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether ' (2008, 524; cf. Foucault 2007 cf. Foucault , 2008 . This, of course, opens up new fields of capitalist intervention. As
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Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff (2009, 3) note, 'the very success of industrial and social modernity in managing risks has in fact generated new risks'. A related point concerns the evolving relationship between neoliberalism and practices of securitization in late modern capitalism. For Deb Cowen (2010, 600), although 'neoliberalism has long been credited with expanding capitalist markets', a necessary 'geography of logistics' has 'quietly put the cold calculation of cost' at the centre of practices of neoliberal securitization. As she points out, vital logistical global networks and trade routes have become 'a security threat', thereby requiring the 'securitization of "logistic space" ' (2010, 602) .
A broader debate about geoeconomics and/or geopolitics has also been engaged in recent years, which has served to illuminate the role of geoeconomic calculation in international relations, in the opening up of new fields of commercial geography, in the shaping of uneven development, and in the perpetuation of international conflict (Dalby 2007; Smith 2008; Sparke 2013 ). Yet, the old concerns of geopolitical calculation, territory and access still matter too, as I hope to argue below. For Matt Sparke (2007, 340) , both geopolitics and geoeconomics are ultimately 'better understood as geostrategic discourses' (2007, 345) , a point most recently echoed by Mona Domosh who has charted the discursive strategies of US interventionism in the early decades of the twentieth century, historicizing the gestation of geoeconomics at the heart of developmentalist discourses on 'America's benevolent role' in world affairs (2013, 962) . As Domosh shows, both geopolitical and geoeconomic imaginings have long coexisted in a discursive field of US global ambition that 'encompasses a way of seeing the world' in which strategies of intervention 'come to be seen as plausible and desirable ' (2013, 945) . Below, I draw upon such a composite In addition, land access was also vital for CENTCOM's declared stabilizing function in the pivotal regional and broader global economy, as I outline below.
The Gulf wars, deterrence and geoeconomics
After the Gulf War, a substantial contingent of CENTCOM forces remained in Saudi Arabia as part of a new US deterrence policy in the Gulf. Their presence in the region throughout the US Central Command and Liberal Imperial Reach 9 1990s was annually presented in CENTCOM's posture statements to the United States Congress as vital to both the US and world economy, despite the typically nebulous and promissory logic of economic security being outlined (US Central Command 1997 , 1998 , 1999b . By the late 1990s, CENTCOM had extended its basing structure and land With a nod to an increasingly cited temporality of preemption in DoD circles, Bush relayed how it was not just 'today's threats' that needed to be securitized but also 'emerging threats' and 'unexpected threats', and that 'a more agile and flexible force' would enable the capacity to 'surge quickly' (US Department of Defense 2004a). A month later, in September 2004, the US Global Defense Posture Review, begun three years earlier, was published. Within it, the military doctrine of 'rapid deployability' is centrally underlined for a grand strategy designed for the 'necessary flexibility and freedom of action to meet 21st- calls 'the old language of resource-driven geopolitics'? As Smith remarks, America's contemporary imperial wars may well force 'geopolitics to the fore', but should not 'blind us to the deeper geo-economic aspiration for global control' (Smith, 2003, xiv) . CENTCOM's intervention in Iraq was never simply about resources, but rather forms part of a much longer US regional grand strategy whose mission has combined both military and economic security interests in endeavouring to shape the regional and global economy. 
